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MORE THAN JUST BAD BLOOD:
REASONABLY ASSESSING FEAR OF AIDS CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a devastating termi-
nal disease that has most likely impacted our culture and legal system
more than any other disease over the last two decades.1 AIDS, which is
caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (H1V),2 is responsible for
1. See, e.g., SUSAN PALMER, AIDS AS AN APOCALYPTIC METAPHOR IN NORTH
AMERIcA 11-12 (1997) (stating that fundamentalist groups viewed HIV/AIDS as
"divine punishment" for immoral lifestyle); DARRELL E. WARD, THE AMFAR AIDS
HANDBOOK 18 (1999) (noting that Americans with Disabilities Act protects people
that are HIV-positive or have AIDS); Mark G. Winiarski, Understanding HIV/AIDS
Using the Biopsychosocial/Spiritual Mode4 in HIV MENTAL HEALTH FOR THE 21ST CEN-
TURY 4 (Mark G. Winiarski ed., 1997) (stating that AIDS is taboo topic for many
and that victims are subjected to condemnation); Karen L. Chadwick, Fear of AIDS:
The Catalyst for Expanding Judicial Recognition of a Duty to Prevent Emotional Distress
Beyond Traditional Bounds, 25 N.M. L. REv. 143, 143 (1995) (stating that public's
awareness of effects of HIV/AIDS has led to generalized fear of its contraction);
Matthew Warren Grill, Comment, Recovery for Emotional Distress Due to Fear of AIDS:
Exposing AIDSphobia in Alabama, 49 ALA. L. REv. 1009, 1011 (1998) (stating that
HIV/AIDS has "reached epidemic proportions").
2. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, What is AIDS? What Causes Aids?, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/
faq/faq2.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2000) (stating that HIV weakens immune sys-
tem to condition known as AIDS). HIV was first detected in serum samples col-
lected in Central Africa in 1959. See GERALD J. STINE, AIDS UPDATE 1999, at 198
(David Kendric Brake ed., Prentice Hall, Inc. 1998) (stating where and when HIV
was first discovered). During the 1960s and 1970s, the virus spread most widely in
Central Africa and Haiti. See id. at 190 (describing spread of AIDS). It is specu-
lated that tourists returning from Haiti accounted for the transmission of the virus
to the United States. See id. (noting belief that tourists carried virus to America).
The first AIDS cases reported by the Center for Disease Control were in New York,
Los Angeles and San Francisco in 1981, which is the year widely considered to be
the date that AIDS was discovered. See id. (recounting disease's arrival to
America); see also KENNETH J. DOKA, AIDS, FEAR, AND SOCIETY: CHALLENGING THE
DREADED DISEASE 62 (1997) (noting that first case of AIDS was reported by Center
for Disease Control on June 5, 1981). Nevertheless, conflicting information sug-
gests that AIDS was present in the United States much earlier. See STINE, supra, at
198 ("According to the CDC's first clinical AIDS definition, at least one case of
AIDS occurred in New York City in 1952 and another in 1959."). A person is diag-
nosed with AIDS if their immune system reaches such a weakened condition that
they succumb to one or multiple viral caused infections, also known as "opportu-
nistic infections," or their T4 cell count drops below a certain level. See id. at xvii
(describing AIDS as "an umbrella term for any or all of 26 known diseases and
their symptoms .... An AIDS diagnosis is also given to HIV-positive people with a
T4 cell count of less than 200/g.L of blood."); see also Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d
327, 329 (Md. 1993) (listing prevalent opportunistic infections); DoKA, supra, at 68
(stating that T4 cells "orchestrate attacks on invading microorganisms");
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1255 (26th ed. 1995) (defining an "opportunistic"
infection as an "organism capable of causing disease only in host whose resistance
(207)
1
Santee: More Than Just Bad Blood: Reasonably Assessing Fear of AIDS Claim
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILLANovA LAW REviEW
approximately 46,000 new victims per year in the United States alone.3
Current estimates show that 403,544 people are now living with the disease
in the United States.4 Nonetheless, America represents only a small per-
centage of the tragedy. 5 Moreover, the ultimate future of the disease re-
mains unclear.
6
On a social level, however, AIDS has brought out the best and worst in
human nature.7 It has forced Americans to face new political issues, some-
times with surprising bravery and courage. 8 Conversely, fear and mis-
is lowered, e.g., by other diseases or drugs"); Mandana Shahvari, Comment,
AfrAIDS: Fear of AIDS as a Cause of Action, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 769, 774 (1994) (ex-
plaining how HIV infects immune system); Larry Thompson, Like No Other.Human
Disease: The AIDS Virus Attacks the Body's Defenses, WASH. PosT, Sept. 4, 1985, at
Health 12 (detailing HIV's destruction of immune system).
3. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Basic Statistics, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/cumulati.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2000) (stating an-
nual infection rate of HRV/AIDS in United States). All told, 430,441 people have
died of AIDS. See id. (stating statistics). "[L] atest statistics ... suggest an eventual
leveling off of the death rate at many thousands per year unless there is further
progress against the disease." Marlene Cimons, New Data Suggest Limits to AIDS
Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1999, at Al. Although AIDS deaths dropped forty-two
percent in 1997 due to powerful drug cocktails, it is just taking longer for people
to succumb tot he ravages of AIDS. See id. at Al, A12 (noting effect of drugs on
AIDS statistics).
4. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, HVSurveillance Report, Tbl.
1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/hasr1102/tablel.htm (last visited Oct.
2, 2000) (stating number of people with HV or AIDS in United States). The
Center for Disease Control estimates that this number may be as high as 900,000.
See Cimons, supra note 3, at Al (stating that Center for Disease Control estimates
that 900,000 people are living with HV or AIDS). This represents approximately
one-third of one percent of America's population. See United States Census Bu-
reau, Population Clocks, available at http://www.census.gov (last visited Sept. 30,
2000) (stating that population of United States stands at 275,843,150).
5. See Hinsite, Global Summary of HIV/AIDS Epidemic, December 1999, available
at http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/social/un/2098.44d3.html#1 (last visited Oct. 9.
2000) (summarizing global statistics as of December 1999). In 1999, 5.6 million
people were newly infected with HIV. See id. (stating statistic as of December
1999). Presently, 33.6 million people in the world are living with HIV/AIDS. See
id. (same). There were also 2.6 million AIDS deaths. See id. (same).
6. See STINE, supra note 2, preface at xviii-xix (describing worst-case scenario as
exponential amount of infections unless cheap, preventive and effective vaccine is
created); Shahvari, supra note 2, at 769 ("[T]he medical and scientific community
can offer the public few absolute guarantees relating to the disease.").
7. See, e.g., DorA, supra note 2, at 80 ("The victim [of AIDS] is identified with
socially defined deviant groups such as homosexuals or drug addicts. Hence the
disease carries a strong moral connotation in which victims are blamed for their
fate."); PALMER, supra note 1, at 20-43 (examining negative and positive responses
to AIDS by Christian establishments); WARD, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that preva-
lence of AIDS has spawned multiple legal defense services).
8. See, e.g., DoA, supra note 2, at 106 (debating whether needle exchange
programs effectively combat spread of HV or if they indirectly condone drug use).
Commentators also debate whether prostitution should be legalized or pornogra-
phy should be more restricted, as measures to combat the spread of the disease.
See id. at 107 (summarizing debates). Another peripheral debate has been about
whether to allow same-sex marriages. Compare Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867
[Vol. 46: p. 207
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perception about AIDS has invaded society since the disease's inception. 9
Ignorantly termed the "gay plague" in the early 1980s, AIDS continues to
unleash hatred and fear even today. 10
As a result of the foregoing factors, AIDS-based claims have spilled
into our courtrooms in various forms.11 One such example is the topic of
this Note, namely the "fear of AIDS" claim based on negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 12 In a fear of AIDS claim, the plaintiff was potentially
or actually exposed to a person or object capable of carrying the disease
(Vt. 1999) ("[T]he State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples
the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont
law."), with Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting
that Florida prohibits same-sex marriage). "[O] thers vehemently oppose anything
that would legitimize gay relationships as conducive to the spread of HIV." DoKe,
supra note 2, at 107. The legitimacy of same-sex marriage must overcome great
obstacles to be recognized. See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against
Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARozo L. REv. 1119, 1124 (1999) ("[A]rguments advanced
against same-sex marriage . . . stem from . . . deeply held beliefs about what is
thought to be the necessary relationship between biological sexual identity and
gender and its appropriate expression.").
9. See Mary McGrory, The Spread of Fear, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1985, at A2
(stating that parents of public school children in Queens protested admission of
HIV infected child by having their children stay at home). Probably the most infa-
mous infected child, Ryan White, was banned from the schools in his hometown of
Kokomo, Indiana. See id. (noting that focus of article is whether AIDS victims have
right to "mingle with their peers"). Others have noted that AIDS was at one time
"dismissed . . . as a disease limited to homosexuals, hemophiliacs, Haitians and
drug abusers." AIDS Doctors Hope for the Best, Prepare for Worst, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Apr. 14, 1985, at AA-7; see also Ann Japenga, Gay Women and the Risk of
AIDS; Lesbians Oppose Misperception That They're All Diseased, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1986,
at View, pt. 5, p. 1 (noting that lesbians suffered assumption that they were all AIDS
carriers).
10. See McGrory, supra note 9, at A2 (noting that religious leader Reverend
Jerry Falwell termed AIDS as "gay plague" and others believed it to be "behaviorally
induced"). Some of the responses to HIV-positive individuals have been severe.
See Associated Press, Fear Increases As AIDS Epidemic Spreads Around the World, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRjBUNE, Nov. 28, 1985, at AAA-18 (noting that British tattoo artists
turned away gay customers); Lynn Simross, 13 Random Victims of an Indiscriminate
Killer-AIDS; Some of the Stories Behind the Death Toll Include a Businessman, Wife and
Mother, Former Priest, Child and Ballet Dancer, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1987, at View 1
(detailing experience of family of father who died of AIDS, which included threats
left in mailbox and poisoning of dog).
11. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-47 (1998) (addressing
whether AIDS is disability under Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Sier-
akowski v. Ryan, 223 F.3d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying injunctive relief to
plaintiff who claimed Illinois AIDS Confidentiality Act was unconstitutional be-
cause Act allowed doctors to test patients without their knowledge); Herring v.
Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000) (addressing whether plaintiffs right
to privacy was breached when probation officer told plaintiffs sister and employer
that he was HIV-positive); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 22 (N.J. 1997)
(suing for fear of AIDS); Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664, 670 (Ohio 1995)
(denying right to sue for emotional distress based on negligent misdiagnosis of
AIDS).
12. For a further discussion of fear of AIDS claims, see infra notes 76-162 and
accompanying text.
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and, as a result, sues for his or her present emotional distress for fear of
contracting HIV.13 The claim is unique in that it explores the edge of tort
liability while simultaneously forcing judges and juries to cope with the
policy issues that surround the disease. 14 At the heart of this debate is
whether a plaintiff must demonstrate actual exposure to HIV/AIDS or,
more simply, that his or her fear of contracting AIDS is reasonable consid-
ering the circumstances. 15
This Note argues that an enhanced reasonableness standard, adopted
in Williamson v. Waldman,16 should govern fear of AIDS claims. 17 The en-
hanced reasonableness standard is consistent with the liberalization of
negligent infliction of emotional distress and adequately addresses the
public policy concerns that affect tort recovery. 18 Part II of this Note dis-
cusses the development of negligent infliction of emotional distress and its
acceptance as a legal concept through bystander and fear of cancer
claims. 19 Part III explains the factors that influence fear of AIDS claims
and presents the actual exposure requirement and enhanced reasonable-
ness standard, both of which are used to evaluate the foreseeability of
emotional distress.20 Part IV contends that an enhanced reasonableness
standard in fear of AIDS claims is consistent with the liberalization of neg-
13. See, e.g., Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Res., Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59, 72 (D.
Mass. 1993) (claiming emotional distress damages after receiving HIV-positive vac-
cine inoculation); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hagan, 750 So. 2d 83, 84-85 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (bringing claim for fear of AIDS after ingesting bottle of Coca-Cola
which apparently contained used condom). But see Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d
196, 205 (Alaska 1995) (holding that plaintiff stated valid negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim based on negligent false HIV-positive diagnosis); Heiner,
652 N.E.2d at 670 (holding that plaintiff did not state valid negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim based on false HIV-positive diagnosis). In Henier, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is
compensable when the plaintiff witnesses, experiences or appreciates real physical
peril. See Heiner, 652 N.E.2d at 669-70 (stating that to recover under negligent
infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must witness, experience or appreciate
real physical peril). Because the plaintiff was misdiagnosed as HIV-positive she
feared a nonexistent physical peril and could not recover. See id. at 670 (stating
that plaintiff's misdiagnosis represented nonexistent physical peril).
14. See, e.g., Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (Ill. 1998) (reviewing pol-
icy arguments in favor of actual exposure requirement).
15. For a further discussion of negative and positive attributes of each stan-
dard of recovery, see infra notes 163-219 and accompanying text.
16. 696 A.2d 14 (NJ. 1997).
17. For a further discussion of the strengths of the enhanced reasonableness
standard, see infra notes 163-219 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the evolution of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress and the reasonableness standard, see infra notes 23-75 and accompa-
nying text.
19. For a further discussion of the evolution of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress and the reasonableness standard, see infra notes 23-75 and accompa-
nying text.
20. For a further discussion of the factors that influence fear of AIDS deci-
sions, see infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46: p. 207
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ligent infliction of emotional distress.21 Additionally, Part IV asserts that
an enhanced reasonableness standard more readily addresses legitimate
fear of AIDS claims, promotes reasonable care and combats ignorance
about the disease.22
II. EVOLUTION OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Fear of AIDS claims ordinarily are brought under the theory of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress because the theory permits recovery
for purely emotional damages based on a negligent level of culpability.
23
Nonetheless, courts have long evaluated purely emotional damages with
suspicion.2 4 Only recently have the courts become more liberalized in
recognizing purely emotional distress damages.2 5 It is important to under-
stand the rationales for this evolution in order to evaluate when compen-
sation for fear of AIDS claims is appropriate.
Throughout the twentieth century, concerns that emotional distress
claims were ingenuine and frivolous have influenced judicial opinions. 26
21. For a further discussion of negative and positive attributes of each stan-
dard of recovery, see infra notes 163-219 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of negative and positive attributes of each stan-
dard of recovery, see infra notes 163-219 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994) (stating
that negligent infliction of emotional distress claim based on zone of danger rule is
for "mental or emotional injury, apart from the tort law concepts of pain and suf-
fering"); Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (per-
mitting recovery for purely emotional distress damages in fear of AIDS claim when
plaintiff pricked his finger on discarded hypodermic needle). Commentators have
described the existence of emotional distress damages as a severe invasion of an
individual's rights. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS § 302, at 821 (2000)
(stating that emotional harm "represent[s] the antithesis of happiness or enjoy-
ment of life which everyone pursues").
24. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Inju-
ries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FoRDHAM L. REV. 527, 529-30 (1984) (ex-
plaining that emotional damages were viewed with suspicion and were subject to
judicial checks); Leslie B. Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 ARiz. L. REV. 1247,
1251-53 (1995) (recounting judicial system's reluctance to permit recovery for
emotional distress); Grill, supra note 1, at 1014 (stating that suspicion of emotional
distress claims was based on their trivial nature).
25. See generally Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980)
(permitting recovery for emotional distress based on defendant physician's negli-
gently misdiagnosing plaintiff's wife with sexually transmitted disease); Rodrigues
v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (permitting recovery of emotional distress
based on extensive flood damage to home); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765,
772-73 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (allowing purely emotional distress damages for
plaintiff stuck in elevator).
26. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 (Cal. 1968) (noting that fear of
fraudulent and indefinable claims are "twin fears" of courts declining to impose
duty to refrain from negligently inflicting emotional distress); Knierim v. Izzo, 174
N.E.2d 157, 164 (Ill. 1961) ("Indiscriminate allowance of actions for mental
anguish would encourage neurotic overreactions to trivial hurts, and the law
should aim to toughen the psyche of the citizen rather than pamper it."); Gardner
v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 268 S.W. 1108, 1110 (Ky. 1925) (stating that it is easy to
5
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As a result, courts created pre-requisites to recovery, beginning with a
physical impact requirement.2 7 Under the physical impact requirement, a
defendant was responsible only for "parasitic" emotional damages that
flowed naturally from a physical impact.28 These parasitic emotional dam-
ages ensured the genuineness of the plaintiffs claim.29
Many courts revised the physical impact requirement in light of the
harsh results that it produced.30 Some jurisdictions allowed recovery
feign emotional distress, yet difficult to disprove); Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279,
1286 (N.J. 1993) (stating that limitations on foreseeability requirement were en-
acted because of concerns with genuineness of claims); cf Bosch v. St. Louis
Healthcare Network, No. 76044, 2000 Mo. App. LEXIS 500, at *13 (Mo. Ct. App.
Apr. 11, 2000) (stating that difficulty proving causal connection between claimed
emotional damages and act by defendant is additional reason for physical impact
requirement); Chadwick, supra note 1, at 143 (stating that courts disfavor recovery
for emotional distress because emotional distress alone is trivial and difficult to
prove); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. Riv. 136, 145-46 (1992) ("Al-
though courts gradually have expanded those emotional injuries for which com-
pensation will be afforded, the law of... negligent infliction of emotional distress
remains a patchwork. Compensable injuries still are, in large part, tied to either
physical impacts, physical manifestations of injury, or other proxies for emotional
distress."); Michael Phillips, Note, Drawing the Line: Missouri Adopts the Zone of Dan-
ger Rule for Bystander Emotional Distress, 56 Mo. L. REv. 1183, 1188 (1991) (stating
four rationales for physical impact requirement).
27. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (holding that
claims for emotional distress without physical injury should be disallowed), with
DOBBS, supra note 23, § 308, at 837 ("[O]nce a personal injury is inflicted, emo-
tional harm would not be stand-alone harm but would instead represent an ele-
ment of the damages for the physical injury."), and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 362-63 (5th ed. 1984) (stating
that courts recognize emotional distress when accompanied by physical injury).
28. See R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 364-65 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan,
J., concurring) (stating that if there is contemporaneous physical impact, defen-
dant is responsible for injury and resulting emotional distress).
29. See Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 201 (Alaska 1995) ("The basic as-
sumption underlying the traditional rule is that emotional distress without physical
injury is . . . easily feigned."). Nevertheless, in Chizmar, the traditional rule was
rejected in favor of a foreseeability test in the context of a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim based on a false HIV-positive diagnosis of the plaintiff. See
id. at 202-03 (stating that severe emotional distress is foreseeable result of misdiag-
nosis of AIDS). The court also relied on the fact that the misdiagnosis arose out of
the doctor-patient relationship, which carries a pre-existing duty. See id. at 203-04
(finding that doctor-patient relationship carries duty in tort); see also Humana, 652
So. 2d at 363 (stating that impact rule assures validity of claims for emotional dis-
tress); KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, § 54, at 363 ("With a cause of action estab-
lished by the physical harm, 'parasitic' damages are awarded, and it is considered
that there is sufficient assurance that the mental injury is not feigned."). But see
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 193 (Mass. 1982) (Wilkins, J., dissenting)
(stating that physical harm requirement does not necessarily ensure genuineness
of emotional distress damages; trier of fact must resolve validity of claim).
30. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980) (accepting x-rays of
pregnant woman as physical impact); Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna W. R.R. Co.,
63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906) (accepting dust in eye as physical impact); Morton v. Stack,
170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (accepting smoke inhalation as physical impact).
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when the claim ensured its own genuineness,3 ' while others required the
plaintiff to demonstrate physical manifestations of the emotional dis-
tress.3 2 In other jurisdictions, a slight or trivial physical impact sufficiently
supported the distress.3 3 For example, in a fear of AIDS claim, a needle
wound to the hand of the plaintiff constituted sufficient physical impact to
support a $250,000 award of emotional distress damages.34 Courts rea-
31. See, e.g., Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 148 So. 154, 154
(Ala. 1933) (stating that jury reasonably inferred negligence to defendant for im-
properly embalming body of plaintiff's husband when body "gave off offensive
odors"). Negligent mishandling of a corpse or negligent delivery of a telegram
decreeing a relative's death typified these claims. See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d
509, 519 (Haw. 1970) (noting that "negligent infliction of emotional distress has
been treated as an independent tort.., in negligent handling of corpses and the
negligent transmission of telegrams likely to cause emotional distress"). But see
Gardner v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 268 S.W. 1108, 1110 (Ky. 1925) (noting that
courts generally ground negligently delivered death telegrams claims in breach of
contract actions).
32. See Chadwick, supra note 1, at 145-46 (stating that "where the actor's con-
duct created a risk of physical harm to the plaintiff that fell short of actually caus-
ing physical harm but did cause emotional injury which, in turn, manifested itself
in physical injury, the plaintiff could recover for both the emotional and physical
injuries"). Requiring physical manifestation of emotional distress validates the
harm. See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 308, at 838 (stating that requiring manifestation
of distress proves that distress is real). Furthermore, some commentators contend
that harm that does not rise to the level of. physical manifestations should not be
compensated. See id. (stating that physical manifestation requirement implies that
'purely mental disturbance is not worth compensating for mere negligence").
33. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, § 54, at 363-64 (collecting examples of
slight physical injuries, including dust in eye). Nevertheless, the physical impact
rule remains in use. See Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 361 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that minority of jurisdictions presently use physical impact rule);
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (stating
that ingestion of indefinite amount of toxically contaminated drinking water con-
stituted physical injury); Dennis G. Bassi, Note, It's All Relative: A Graphical Reason-
ing Model for Liberalizing Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Beyond the
Immediate Family, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 913, 922 (1996) (noting that because physical
impact requirement has been interpreted broadly it has not funneled out fraudu-
lent or trivial claims); see also Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S.
424, 432 (1997) (finding that plaintiff's exposure one hour per working day to
insulation dust containing asbestos, which did not result in symptoms of cancer,
did not constitute physical impact within meaning of Federal Employers' Liability
Act); Brown v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., No. 2880, 2000 Pa. Super. LEXIS
2464, at *21 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2000) (stating that injection to treat nonexis-
tent and negligently misdiagnosed syphilis did not constitute physical impact be-
cause it was relatively painless).
34. See Dollar Inn, Inc. v. Slone, 695 N.E.2d 185, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that plaintiff succeeded on general negligence claim that demonstrated
physical impact and included parasitic mental distress damages). In Dollar, the
plaintiff, while residing in a room rented from the defendant, punctured her hand
on a discarded hypodermic needle inside a roll of toilet paper in the bathroom.
See id. at 186 (stating facts). A motel employee told the plaintiff that the needle
.probably was from an intravenous drug user on the hotel staff." Id.
7
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soned that these barriers grounded the speculative nature of emotional
damages and ensured the genuineness of the distress.35
Although many jurisdictions still rely on one of the aforementioned
barriers or exceptions to recovery, many other jurisdictions now recognize
an independent tort for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 36
This progression is credited to the development of psychological science 37
and the realization that these barriers to recovery amounted to nothing
more than mechanical limitations to authentic injury.38 Prime examples
35. See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 308, at 837 (stating that some courts required
physical injury or impact be actionable to recover emotional damages).
36. Compare Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 1997) (maintaining
physical impact requirement but allowing exception for father's emotional distress
over wife's stillbirth), Chambley v. Apple Rests., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1998) (requiring that physical impact rule be met before woman who found
condom in Santa Fe chicken salad could recover emotional distress damages), and
Brown, 2000 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2464, at *22 (stating that recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress is inappropriate without contemporaneous physical
harm), with In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (D. Haw. 1990)
("[T] he recovery of emotional distress damages is an independent cause of action
in Hawaii."), Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 338-39 (Md. 1993) (stating that plain-
tiffs can recover emotional distress for fear of AIDS if they objectively demonstrate
its existence), and Fairfax Hosp. v. Curtis, 492 S.E.2d 642, 647 (Va. 1997) (stating
that physical harm or wanton and willful misconduct by defendant generally is
required to recover emotional distress, but allowing exception for hospital's
wrongful disclosure of plaintiff's medical records). See R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc.,
652 So. 2d 360, 363 (Fla. 1995) (refusing to make exception to physical impact
rule for negligent misdiagnosis of HIV). Although the plaintiff in Humana be-
lieved that he was HIV-positive for nineteen months, the Florida Supreme Court
refused to make an exception to the physical impact requirement because it would
raise the cost of medical care and open the floodgates to negligent misdiagnosis of
all diseases. See id. at 363-64 (stating reasons to maintain physical impact rule in
HIV misdiagnosis claims). Nevertheless, the court noted that presenting evidence
of "unnecessary and harmful medical treatment" could possibly have satisfied the
physical impact requirement. See id. at 364 (identifying evidence sufficient to sat-
isfy impact requirement in case involving negligent misdiagnosis of HJV).
37. See Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 962 (D. Kan.
1986) (stating that modern medicine has decreased potential for fraudulent
claims); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (noting
that modem psychology is more precise method to evaluate genuineness of emo-
tional distress than physical impact requirement); David J. Leibson, Recovery of
Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM." L. 163,
190-201 (1977) (discussing development of medical evidence of emotional dis-
tress); Levit, supra note 26, at (1992) (noting that psychology has advanced signifi-
cantly); Kenneth W. Miller, Note, Toxic Torts and Emotional Distress: The Case for an
Independent Cause of Action for Fear of Future Harm, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 681, 693 (1998)
(" [W] hile the physical injury rule as a filter against frivolous claims may have been
reasonable a century ago, the current state of medical science and technology, as
well as the modern advances in human psychology make the physical injury rule
unnecessary as a screen for genuineness.").
38. See, e.g., Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Res., Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59, 75-76 (D.
Mass. 1993) (permitting recovery of emotional distress because plaintiffs direct
exposure to HIV-positive vaccine inoculation provided genuineness of emotional
damages); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (lib-
eralizing recovery for emotional distress by permitting claims absent physical im-
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of recovery for purely emotional distress are "bystander" and "fear of can-
cer" claims.
39
A. Bystander Recovery-Evolving from Zone of Danger to Foreseeability
Bystander claims illustrate how courts revise standards of liability to
meet the demands of legitimate claims. 40 Ordinarily, a bystander claim
based on negligent infliction of emotional distress means that the plaintiff
perceived a serious injury to a close relative and, as a result, suffered se-
vere emotional distress.4 1 Because bystander plaintiffs ordinarily pursue
pact). In Bass, the Missouri Supreme Court created the following guidelines for
recovery: "(1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an
unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the emotional distress or mental
injury must be medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity so as to be
medically significant." Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772-73.
By not compensating emotional harm, the judicial system implicitly sends the
message that the plaintiff's own mental defect causes the emotional distress. See
Levit, supra note 26, at 175 (stating that denial of emotional distress claims rein-
forces view that plaintiffs are mentally weak). Nevertheless, the establishment of
right to privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress torts represent the
movement of the judicial system towards recognizing the validity of emotional dis-
tress. Compare Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 817 (Cal. 1989) ("With recognition
of intentional infliction of emotional distress as discrete tort cause of action, this
court accepted ... freedom from emotional distress as an interest worthy of pro-
tection .... ."), and State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284-86
(Cal. 1952) (formulating tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress), with
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193,
193-200 (1890) (advocating intangible right to privacy). In Right to Privacy, the
authors termed the now widely accepted right to privacy a "right to be let alone."
See id. at 193 (stating that "scope of... legal rights [has] broadened; and now the
right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let alone
. . ."). Another commentator further credits American courts' increased recogni-
tion of emotional distress to our rapid industrialization and advancement of psy-
chology. See Levit, supra note 26, at 159-60 (suggesting that increased technology
and industrialization, and its broad effect on people, was responsible for judicial
theory that was more receptive to intangible harm); see also Taylor v. Baptist Med.
Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (stating that "to continue to require
physical injury ... when mental suffering may be equally recognizable standing
alone, would be an adherence to procrustean principles which have little or no
resemblance to medical realities"); Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769 (noting that refinement
of psychiatric tests enables science to establish existence and severity of psychic
harm with reasonable certainty).
39. For a further discussion of bystander and fear of cancer claims, see infra
notes 40-75 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Thing, 771 P.2d at 816-30 (explaining development of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress case law to permit recovery for bystanders).
41. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981) (adopting by-
stander recovery for plaintiff who witnessed defendant's vehicle strike mother's
vehicle); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (N.H. 1979) (permitting recovery of
emotional distress for parents that contemporaneously perceived daughter's acci-
dent); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526-28 (N.J. 1980) (relying on Dillon factors
to award emotional distress damages to mother who watched unsuccessful efforts
to rescue her seven-year-old son trapped in elevator shaft). "No loss is greater than
the loss of a loved one, and no tragedy is more wrenching than the helpless appre-
hension of the death or serious injury of one whose very existence is a precious
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purely emotional distress damages, many courts limit liability by applying
the "zone of danger" rule.4 2 The zone of danger rule allows the bystander
plaintiff to recover only if he or she is endangered by the same physical
harm that caused physical injury to a third party.4 - The zone of danger
rule theorizes that the defendant breaches a duty to the plaintiff when the
defendant endangers the plaintiff with physical harm. 44 Courts and com-
mentators believe that the zone of danger rule deters unlimited liability,
ensures the genuineness of the claim and provides courts and juries with
an objective standard that can be consistently applied.45
1. Dillon v. Legg Recognizes Legitimate Claims
Nevertheless, the zone of danger rule was rejected by the California
Supreme Court in the landmark tort case, Dillon v. Legg,4 6 in favor of gen-
eral guidelines of foreseeability. 4 7 In Dillon, plaintiffs, a mother and
treasure." Portee, 417 A.2d at 526; see also Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 767
(Haw. 1974) (permitting recovery of emotional distress for ten-year-old who wit-
nessed his step-grandmother struck and killed by defendant's automobile); Sinn v.
Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 686 (Pa. 1979) (permitting recovery of emotional distress for
mother who saw her daughter struck and killed by defendant's vehicle); D'Ambra
v. United States, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (R.I. 1975) (permitting recovery of emotional
distress for mother who witnessed her daughter struck and killed by negligently
driven mail truck); Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103 (Wash. 1976) (allowing
recovery of emotional distress when plaintiffs neighbor drove her vehicle into
plaintiffs back porch and plaintiff suffered heart ailment thereafter).
42. See generally Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitray Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477
(1982) (arguing that recovery for emotional distress should be limited to zone of
danger rule).
43. SeeJ. Mark Appleberry, Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Fo-
cus on Relationships, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 305-09 (1995) (describing parameters
of zone of danger rule).
44. See, e.g., Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 599-600
(Mo. 1990) (adopting variation of zone of danger test); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461
N.E.2d 843, 844 (N.Y. 1984) (stating theory of zone of danger). The Court of
Appeals of New York stated:
Where a defendant's... negligen[ce] ... creat[es] an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to a plaintiff and such conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about injuries to the plaintiff ... of shock or fright resulting
from his or her contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury
or death inflicted ... on a member of the plaintiff's immediate family in
his or her presence, the plaintiff may recover damages for such injuries.
Bovson, 461 N.E.2d at 844.
The zone of danger test also may require that the plaintiff demonstrate physi-
cal manifestations of distress. See DoBBs, supra note 23, § 309, at 840 (describing
requirements under zone of danger test).
45. See Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980) (stating that zone
of danger rule limits liability and promotes consistent application); Bovsun, 461
N.E.2d at 848 (stating that zone of danger rule stops unlimited liability and pro-
vides objective test).
46. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
47. For a discussion of the foreseeability guidelines adopted in Dillon, see infra
notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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daughter, witnessed the defendant negligently strike and kill the mother's
other daughter with his vehicle. 48 At the time of the accident, the mother
was outside of the zone of danger, while the witnessing daughter was close
enough to be inside the zone. 49 Therefore, the trial court denied the
mother recovery for her emotional distress but permitted the daughter to
recover for hers.50
Finding the distinction of distance arbitrary, the California Supreme
Court adopted general guidelines of foreseeability. 51 The court explained
that judges and juries should distinguish between genuine and fraudulent
claims, which makes a per se rule like the zone of danger rule unneces-
sary. 52 The court also encouraged courts to make their own "case by case
analysis" while using their foreseeability factors as a "guide."5 3
2. Current State of Bystander Claims
Bystander recovery still varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.5 4 Nev-
ertheless, courts credit Dillon, described as a "pebble cast in the pond,"
with liberalizing recovery of emotional distress.5 5 Many other jurisdictions
adopted the Dillon requirements, albeit with some modifications and ex-
48. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914 (stating facts).
49. See id. at 915 (explaining trial court's basis for summary judgment).
50. See id. (stating facts).
51. See id. at 920 (adopting foreseeability guidelines). The guidelines
adopted by the California Supreme Court are:
Whether [a] plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon a plaintiff from the sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether
plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence
of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Id. Nevertheless, courts have, at times, applied the guidelines fairly strictly. See
Maldonado v. Nat'l Acme Co., 73 F.3d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying plaintiffs
bystander claim in which he witnessed in close proximity, fatal injury to co-worker,
because he was not member of immediate family); Burgess v. Sup. Ct., 831 P.2d
1197, 1200-01 (Cal. 1992) (stating that claim in which plaintiffs baby was negli-
gently misdelivered, causing brain damage to baby, was not bystander claim be-
cause plaintiff-mother did not perceive delivery complications until after delivery).
52. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 917 n.3 (stating that "courts are responsible for
dealing with cases on their merits. . ."). Furthermore, the court announced that
the legal system should never erect per se rules at the expense of legitimate claims.
See id. at 917-18 (stating that argument for zone of danger rule rests on assumption
that judges and juries cannot distinguish fraudulent and genuine claims).
53. See id. at 919-25 (explaining that claims should be evaluated on case by
case basis). The court concluded by stating that "[t]he test that we have set forth
will aid in the proper resolution of future cases." Id. at 925.
54. For a further discussion of the jurisdictional acceptance of Dillon, see infra
note 56 and accompanying text.
55. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 819 (Cal. 1989) (describing Dillon as
pebble cast into pond because it caused ripples in tort recovery); Amodio v. Cun-
ningham, 438 A.2d 6, 9-10 (Conn. 1980) (crediting Dillon with directly affecting
courts in their respective decisions to permit recovery in bystander claims).
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ceptions.56 Nevertheless, many reiterate the fundamental goal of by-
stander recovery, addressing legitimate emotional distress claims.
57
B. Fear of Cancer Claims-Continuing Recognition of Legitimate Emotional
Distress Claims
Fear of cancer claims are a relatively new phenomenon that exemplify
the progress that tort law has made in recognizing emotional distress dam-
56. See Tommy's Elbow Room v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1041-43 (Alaska
1986) (adopting Dillon foreseeability factors and permitting recovery for plaintiff
that learned of accident immediately after it occurred); Thing, 771 P.2d at 815
(limiting eligible plaintiffs to closely related persons and those who were actually
present at scene and aware of accident); Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 855
(Conn. 1996) (citing Dillon and adopting foreseeability test for bystander claims);
Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985) (adopting foreseeability factors
but holding that plaintiff must demonstrate physical manifestations of psychic
trauma); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 765 (Haw. 1974) (adopting foreseeabil-
ity factors and permitting recovery for emotional distress absent physical impact or
physical manifestations); Fineran v. Pickett, 465 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Iowa 1991) (de-
nying recovery because plaintiffs witnessed only aftermath of relative's bicycle acci-
dent); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570 (La. 1990) (adopting
foreseeability factors similar to those in Dillon without attempting to establish con-
crete rules); Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 284-85 (Me. 1992) (adopting fore-
seeability factors and denying recovery to plaintiffs who did not see son's injuries
until son was at hospital); Stockdale v. Bird & Son, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 951, 953-54
(Mass. 1987) (adopting foreseeability factors); Nugent v. Bauermeister, 489
N.W.2d 148, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d
437, 444 (Miss. 1982) (permitting recovery for emotional distress after witnessing
fire to home and pulling wife from wreckage); Versland v. Caron Transport, 671
P.2d 583, 585-87 (Mont. 1983) (citing Dillon and adopting foreseeability factors);
James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 114-15 (Neb. 1985) (adopting foreseeability fac-
tors); Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437, 443 (Nev. 1989) (same); Wil-
der v. City of Keene, 557 A.2d 636, 638 (N.H. 1989) (same); Dunphy v. Gregor,
642 A.2d 372, 375-76 (N.J. 1994) (adopting foreseeability factors and permitting
bystander recovery for fiancee); Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675, 678 (N.J. 1989)
(adopting foreseeability factors); Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 257-58 (N.M. 1990)
(same); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 98 (N.C.
1990) (same); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766 (Ohio 1983) (adopting elastic
version of Dillon foreseeability factors); Sinn v. Burd 404 A.2d 672, 685-86 (Pa.
1979) (adopting foreseeability factors); Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d 894, 895-
97 (R.I. 1988) (same); Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465, 466-67
(S.C. 1985) (same); Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923, 923-24 (Tex.
1988) (same); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 787 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Wash. 1990) (same);
Heldreth v. Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157, 162 (W. Va. 1992) (same); Contreras v. Carbon
County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 843 P.2d 589, 593-94 (Wyo. 1992) (same). Nevertheless,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts the zone of danger rule. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) TORTS § 436(A) (1965) (limiting exception to physical impact require-
ment for zone of danger rule).
57. See, e.g., Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at 767 (explaining that Dillon foreseeability
factors should be elastic so all legitimate claims will be heard); Sinn, 404 A.2d at
677 (stating that zone of danger rule is unfair because legitimate emotional dis-
tress is as likely to occur when parent witnesses death of child as when someone is
in zone of danger).
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ages. 58 A fear of cancer claim arises when the plaintiff was exposed to a
known carcinogen and sues for the present emotional distress stemming
from the fear that he or she will develop cancer. 59 Fear of cancer claims
resemble fear of AIDS claims in some respects. 60 Both claims pursue re-
covery for the present emotional distress suffered over the fear of develop-
ing a disease in the future.6 1 Additionally, in both claims plaintiffs often
cannot demonstrate any physical effects from exposure, and thus, courts
are often skeptical as to whether or not a plaintiff has suffered a compen-
sable injury.62 The similarities have led courts to extend fear of cancer
principles to fear of AIDS claims. 63
58. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action,
85 GEO. L.J. 295, 315 n.91 (1996) (noting that common law courts have begun to
recognize new causes of action relating to disease exposure, such as fear of cancer,
over the past decade).
59. See Chadwick, supra note 1, at 153-56 (describing development of
cancerphobia claim). Chadwick noted:
The typical cancerphobia case arises when the plaintiff is exposed to a
known carcinogen. Because of long latency periods, idiosyncratic re-
sponses to exposure, and the inability of medical science to predict the
probability of cancer actually developing, the plaintiff may not have suf-
fered a compensable physical injury at the time the suit is initiated.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff may allege emotional distress at the possibility
that an exposure to a carcinogen might result in cancer.
Id. at 153; see also Temple-Inland Products Corp. v. Carter,. 993 S.W.2d 88, 89-90
(Tex. 1999) (stating that plaintiffs who feared developing cancer and who alleged
that their chances of developing cancer increased from one in 1,000,000 to one in
500,000 over next ten to fifteen years because of exposure to asbestos, did not state
cause of action because, absent physical injury, Texas does not generally recognize
negligent infliction of emotional distress).
There are two other claims based on exposure to carcinogens: increased risk
of disease and medical monitoring. See Symposium, Evolving Standards for Fear of
Future Disease Claims in the Post-Potter Era, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 311-14 (1997)
(describing different causes of action). In an increased risk cause of action, the
plaintiff sues for the enhanced risk of contracting a disease after toxic exposure,
not for the present emotional injury for fear of the disease. See id. at 311-12
(describing increased risk of disease cause of action). Medical monitoring claims
seek compensation for the out-of-pocket expenses plaintiffs incur because of diag-
nostic tests and exams after exposure. See id. 312-14 (describing medical monitor-
ing cause of action).
60. For further discussion of the similarities between the diseases, see infra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
61. Compare Temple-Inland, 993 S.W.2d at 89 (stating that claim is for present
fear of developing cancer because of asbestos exposure), with Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Hagan, 750 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (bringing claim for fear
of developing AIDS after drinking bottle of Coca-Cola that apparently contained
used condom). The object later turned out to be mold. See id. at 85 (stating that
object in Coca-Cola bottle was mold).
62. See Temple-Inland, 993 S.W.2d at 93 (stating that it is difficult to distinguish
genuine claims from false claims when court is forced to predict whether plaintiff
will develop cancer after exposure to asbestos).
63. See Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1074 (Ct. App. 1994) (apply-
ing Potters more likely than not standard to fear of AIDS claim); Lubowitz v. Albert
Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.2d 3, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (stating that court is
"guided by decisions which involve similar 'risk of contracting disease' claims"
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1. Potter v. Firestone & Rubber Co. Sets Strict Standard of Recovery
In the seminal case of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,6 4 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court addressed the standard of recovery for fear of cancer
claims and created the highest barrier to recovery of the jurisdictions that
recognize an independent cause of action for fear of cancer claims.65 The
Potter court held that a plaintiff could recover emotional distress damages
if "it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will develop the cancer in the
future due to the toxic exposure." 66 The four plaintiffs in Potter claimed
that the defendant, Firestone, illegally disposed of toxic waste in the land-
fill that abutted their homes.67 As a result, the plaintiffs alleged fear of
cancer because trace elements of the toxic chemicals seeped into their
drinking water.68 The court ultimately remanded the case to the appellate
level to determine if the plaintiffs' claims of emotional distress met the
more likely than not standard.69 The court's primary concern was that an
infinite class of plaintiffs would result because of the exposure to carcino-
gens that people experience everyday. 70
when evaluating fear of AIDS claims); Vance A. Fink, Jr., Comment, Emotional Dis-
tress Damages for Fear of Contracting AIDS: Should Plaintiffs Have to Show Exposure to
H/V?, 99 Dicv. L. REv. 779, 785-86 (1995) (stating that courts look to fear of cancer
cases for guidance in addressing fear of AIDS claims); Grill, supra note 1, at 1015-
18 (1998) (relating fear of AIDS claims to fear of cancer claims).
64. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
65. See Potter, 863 P.2d at 816 (setting out requirements for recovery under
negligent infliction of emotional distress in fear of cancer claims).
66. Id. at 816 (emphasis added). The court relaxed the more likely than not
standard if the exposure was a result of the defendant's oppression, fraud or mal-
ice. See id. at 817-18 (discussing recovery when defendant's culpability rises to level
of oppression, fraud or malice). The court stated:
Once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has acted with oppres-
sion, fraud or malice, the plaintiff must still demonstrate that his or her
fear of cancer is reasonable, genuine and serious in order to recover dam-
ages .... In addition, the plaintiff must show that his or her actual risk of
cancer is significant before recovery will be allowed. Under this reason-
ing, a plaintiff's fear is not compensable when the risk of cancer is signifi-
cantly increased, but remains a remote possibility.
Id. at 818.
67. See id. at 801 (stating facts).
68. See id. (stating facts).
69. See id. at 827 (remanding case).
70. See id. at 811 ("As a starting point in our analysis, we recognize the indis-
putable fact that all of us are exposed to carcinogens every day."). The court theo-
rized that a low standard for recovery would result in higher insurance costs for
toxic tort risks, which would ultimately be borne by the public in the form of
higher costs for goods and services. See id. at 812 (explaining that cost of infinite
class of plaintiffs would be borne by consumers).
[Vol. 46: p. 207
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2. Current State of Fear of Cancer Claims
Similar to bystander claims in recent years, courts have liberalized
standards for recovery of fear of cancer damages.7 Like the Potter court,
many of the courts that recognize a stand-alone cause of action for fear of
cancer have departed from the more likely than not standard. 72 These
courts instead look to factors such as expert testimony and the likelihood
of the plaintiff's possibility of developing the disease.73 Nevertheless,
otherjurisdictions retain a physical injury requirement to establish a viable
claim for fear of cancer.7 4 Although recovery varies by jurisdiction, a pro-
gression toward wider recovery persists. 75
71. See, e.g., Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury
Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear of Diseases" Cases, 28
TORT & INS. L.J. 1,4 (1992) (stating that Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Texas and Washington have removed physical injury requirement in fear of disease
claims). Nevertheless, of the jurisdictions that retain a physical injury require-
ment, some require only physical manifestations of the emotional distress. See id.
at 1 (stating that some courts require only physical manifestations of emotional
distress); see also Slaymaker v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 540 N.W.2d 459, 461(Iowa 1995) (creating two-prong test that requires increased statistical likelihood
of developing cancer and manifestations of emotional distress).
72. See, e.g., Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1993)
(permitting recovery for fear of cancer on showing of reasonableness of anguish
and compensation sought); Day v. Natl. Lead of Ohio, 851 F. Supp. 869, 878 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (holding that exposure alone could constitute physical injury making
resulting emotional distress reasonable); Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F.
Supp. 1400, 1408 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (recognizing emotional distress for fear of can-
cer that is medically significant); Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.
2d 648, 658 (Miss. 1995) (requiring that there must be proof of exposure to a
dangerous substance and medical evidence of potential future illness to recover
for fear of future illness).
73. See Mark A. Koppel, Note, Gilliam v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories: An
Introduction to Fear-of-Disease Damages in Arkansas, 48 ARx. L. REv. 555, 560-63 (1995)
(explaining factors applied to fear of cancer claims).
74. See, e.g., Triche v. Overnite Transp. Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10168, at
*43 (E.D. La. July 15, 1996) (requiring that plaintiff demonstrate actual injury); In
re Asbestos Litig., 1995 Del. LEXIS 323, at *8 (Del. Sept. 5, 1995) (implying that
pleural thickening could establish requisite physical injury requirement); Capital
Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ky. 1994) (requiring physical injury
for fear of cancer claim); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Mass. 1982)
(denying recovery because plaintiff failed to establish physical injury); Wolff v. A-
One Oil, Inc., 627 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (App. Div. 1995) (requiring evidence of asbes-
tos-related injury to recover for fear of cancer); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d
232, 238-39 (Pa. 1996) (requiring physical injury for fear of cancer claim).
75. For a further discussion ofjurisdictions discarding physical injury require-
ment, see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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III. COMPOSITION OF FEAR OF AIDS CLAIMS
A. Influential Factors in Fear of AIDS Claims
In light of fear of cancer claims and the prevalence of fear of disease
claims in general, plaintiffs have brought fear of AIDS claims.7 6 Before
examining the legal standards of recovery for fear of AIDS claims, it is
important to understand first how HIV/AIDS is transmitted, as well as
some additional influential factors. 77 Because most fear of AIDS claims
are based on a brief event of potential or actual exposure to HIV/AIDS,
the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear of contracting HIV/AIDS relies
heavily on the circumstances of the transmission. 78 Furthermore, judges
and juries should consider the dynamics of the testing period and the dis-
ease's physical and mental effects before drawing conclusions about the
claim's validity.
79
1. Transmission of AIDS
Although the methods of transmission of AIDS are fairly well estab-
lished, a degree of uncertainty still remains.80 Transmission generally re-
quires an exchange of bodily fluids.8 1 The three most prevalent modes of
HIV transmission are: (1) sexual intercourse with an infected person; (2)
injection with HIV-positive fluid in the form of drugs, needles, syringes or
blood; and (3) transmission from an HIV-infected mother to her fetus in
utero, during childbirth, from mother to infant or during breast-feed-
76. See Fink, supra note 63, at 785-86 (stating that fear of cancer claims wid-
ened recovery for fear of AIDS claims).
77. For a further discussion of the factors that influence fear of AIDS deci-
sions, see infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
78. See Jill Trachtenberg, Living in Fear: Recovering Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress Damages Based on the Fear of Contracting AIDS, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 529, 543 (1999) (stating that courts consider mode of transmission in mak-
ing decisions).
79. For a further discussion of the influential factors in fear of AIDS claims,
excluding mode of transmission, see infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
80. See Chadwick, supra note 1, at 157 ("Although the process of HIV transmis-
sion and infection has been studied in depth, much is still unknown."); cf. Harold
Jaffe, The Application of Medical Facts to the Courts, in AIDS AND THE COURTS 16
(Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990) (explaining that cases that are
initially categorized as unknown mode of transmission "largely represent incom-
plete information"). Many of the victims in this category either do not want to be
interviewed or die before the interview may be conducted. See id. (identifying
victims that fall into category of unknown mode of transmission). When these
victims are ultimately interviewed, the majority of them are reclassified into an
alternate category of transmission. See id. (stating that people this category of
transmissions are generally assigned to a different category).
81. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 329 (Md. 1993) (noting that HIV is
commonly transmitted through genital fluids and blood). HIV/AIDS is a commu-
nicable disease because the causative agent can be transmitted from one person to
another. See STINE, supra note 2, at 187 (defining HIV). HIV/AIDS can incubate
in a person's system symptom-free for up to a decade. See Faya, 620 A.2d at 329
(stating that HIV can reside in person symptom-free for up to ten years).
[Vol. 46: p. 207
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ing.8 2 It is well documented that HIV is not transmitted through the air,
tears, phones, toilet seats, eating utensils, drinking glasses, a person's
clothes or insects.
8 3
Statistically, if a person is exposed to HIV, the chances of transmission
are relatively low.8 4 The chances of infection through a needlestick in
which the hypodermic needle contains HIV-positive blood are one in
300.85 The risk of contracting HIV/AIDS through the nose, mouth or
skin is one in 1000.86 Of course, both of these levels of risk could increase
or decrease depending on the circumstances of exposure.8 7
82. See STINE, supra note 2, at 187 (listing most prevalent modes of transmis-
sion). Although sexual intercourse is the most prevalent mode of transmission, it
is considered inefficient because exposure will most likely not produce infection.
See id. at 187 (stating that sexual intercourse does not always transmit HIV). "HIV
is transmitted more efficiently through intravenous ... routes." Id. at 187. Other
documented cases of HIV transmitted through means other than the three most
often modes include: three cases of home nursing care where there was skin to
bodily secretion contact, a mother that became infected through extensive unpro-
tected exposure to her child's blood and secretions, and two adolescent brothers
with hemophilia that shared a razor. See id. at 194-96 (detailing cases where HIV
was transmitted through rare method along with table). In one rare documented
case, a man contracted HIV from his brother after a bloody fight. See id. at 196
(noting that newly infected brother denied all other means of viable transmission
and that strand of virus found in newly infected brother was identical to that in
already infected brother).
83. See id. at 187 (listing ways HIV is not transmitted). Generally, HIV is not
transmitted through casual contact, although one case of HIV was traced to deep
kissing. See id. (stating that one case of HIV transmission through deep kissing has
been documented). Moreover, in one study, no family members that shared a
toothbrush with an infected person contracted the virus. See id. at 193 (describing
this particular result of the study).
84. For a discussion of statistical chances of contracting HIV, see supra notes
82-83 and accompanying text.
85. See Center for Disease Control, Occupational Exposure to HIV: Information
for Healthcare Workers, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/faq.htm (last
visited Jan. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Occupational Exposure to HIV] (stating that risk of
infection is about three-tenths of one percent).
86. See id. (stating that risk of HRV infection after exposure to HIV-infected
blood of the eye, nose or mouth is about one-tenth of one percent).
87. See id. (stating that risk through skin contact varies depending on amount
of blood and condition of skin). Moreover, the risk of infection for an uninfected
female through unprotected vaginal intercourse with an infected male is one in
100, while risk of infection for an uninfected male through vaginal intercourse
with an infected female is one in 1000. See WARD, supra note 1, at 38 (stating
statistics).
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2. The Testing Period and Physical and Mental Effects
AIDS is also devastating in other ways. 88 First, it is incurable. 89 Sec-
ond, AIDS causes victims to deteriorate physically. 90 Third, and most im-
portantly, in the context of fear of AIDS claims, potential exposure to
HIV/AIDS is treated the same as actual exposure.91 HIV test results are
not conclusive for six months.92 As a result, someone that is potentially
exposed to HIV/AIDS must take identical precautions as someone that is
actually exposed to ensure that he or she does not transmit the disease.
93
This includes limiting association with family and friends to casual con-
tact. 94 This six-month period can have deep psychological effects on a
person.
95
88. See Shahvari, supra note 2, at 769 (noting unique characteristics of AIDS).
89. See Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1068 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting
that AIDS is 100% fatal); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 329 (Md. 1993) ("AIDS is
invariably fatal."). Even though "drug cocktails" have prolonged victims' lives
longer than ever before, the doses are physically difficult to ingest and the regimen
is difficult to follow. Drug cocktails represent the regimen of drugs HIV-positive
persons take to slow the development of HIV to AIDS. See WARD, supra note 1, at
68-103 (describing drug therapy). Moreover, physicians fear that HIV/AIDS will
build up a tolerance to the cocktails, forcing victims to either ingest more or forfeit
the benefits. See id. (noting possible diminishing efficacy of drug cocktails). An-
other impediment to care for victims is that the drugs cost $2000 to $7000 annu-
ally, with most people taking three types of pills simultaneously. See id. at 69
(stating cost of drugs).
90. See SUZANNE LEGO, FEAR AND AIDS/HIV: EMPATHY AND COMMUNICATION 5
(1994) (stating that "HIV-infected persons may... fear ... physical and mental
deterioration"); WARD, supra note 1, at 60-63 (describing physical effects of HIV/
AIDS). About sixty percent of victims experience gastrointestinal disorders, which,
for example, can result in wasting. See id. at 62 (describing wasting). Wasting is
defined as ten percent baseline weight loss coupled with diarrhea over a span of
thirty days. See id. (same). About thirty to fifty percent of the victims develop neu-
rological problems. See id. at 62-64 (describing neurological disorders that many
victims develop). For example, AIDS dementia complex, which affects brain tis-
sue, can result in loss of memory. See id. at 63 (describing AIDS dementia
complex).
91. See Hartwig v. Or. Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Neb. 1998)
("[M] odern medicine treats a potential exposure to HIV virtually the same as it treats
an actual exposure to HIV."); Shahvari, supra note 2, at 800 (outlining CDC require-
ments when someone is potentially exposed to HIV/AIDS).
92. See Kerins, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 1068 (stating that HIV test is ninety-five
percent accurate six months after exposure).
93. For a further discussion of the precautions that a person potentially ex-
posed to HIV/AIDS must take, see infra note 182 and accompanying text.
94. For a further discussion of these precautions and others a person poten-
tially exposed to HIV/AIDS must take, see infra note 182 and accompanying text.
95. See LEGo, supra note 90, at 13-23 (explaining thatinfected individuals may
experience loss of control, helplessness, feeling of victimization, reduction in self-
esteem, changes in physical appearance, sense of isolation, guilt over lifestyle, an-
ger, depression, paranoia, fear of violence against them, sense of betrayal and es-
cape into drugs); John Schieszer, The Down Side of Home HIV Tests, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 13, 1995, at 1E (stating that people must psychologically prepare
for positive result and that negative of home testing is lack of counseling); see also
[Vol. 46: p. 207
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Finally, people with AIDS are subject to negative stigmatization by so-
ciety.9 6 Although AIDS has been around for two decades, society still os-
tracizes people with HIV/AIDS. 97 The disease stirs strong feelings of fear,
which erupt in discrimination and violence. 98 Thus, a part of the "fear"
generating a fear of AIDS claim must incorporate all of the aforemen-
tioned factors.
B. Establishing Proximate Cause
Because fear of AIDS claims are brought under negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiff must demonstrate duty, breach, causation
and damages.99 Proximate causation evaluates whether the plaintiffs
harm, in the form of emotional distress, was a foreseeable result of the
defendant's negligence. 10 0 Here, courts disagree over whether the plain-
tiff must demonstrate actual exposure or only that the fear is reasonable to
establish proximate cause. 10 1
Sandor & Berry, supra note 24, at 1255 (noting that mental trauma can be more
devastating than physical trauma).
96. See Ellen L. Luepke, Note, HIVMisdiagnosis: Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress and the False-Positive, 81 IowA L. REv. 1229, 1229 (1996) ("Because AIDS is a
terminal illness, and because modem American culture still stigmatizes HIV-posi-
tive and AIDS-inflicted individuals as unclean or dangerous, any positive diagnosis,
including a false-positive HIV test result, can be an emotionally taxing
experience.").
97. See, e.g., Winiarski, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that White House guards
wore rubber gloves in 1995 to receive gay guest).
98. See, e.g., DoKA, supra note 2, at 64 (suggesting that Reagan administration
responded slowly with funding to combat AIDS in early 1980s because AIDS was
associated with homosexuals and fundamental religious right sect of Republicans
was strongly opposed to gay lifestyle). Leaders of the religious right boldly voiced
their negative opinions about the homosexual lifestyle. See id. at 64 (quoting relig-
ious right leader, Pat Buchanan, "the poor homosexuals-they have declared war
on nature and now nature is exacting an awful retribution"). Conservative colum-
nist, William F. Buckley, suggested that persons with AIDS be tattooed to control
its spread. See id. at 68 (noting Buckley's proclamation).
99. See, e.g., Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill. 1991) (stating that
plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation and damages to succeed on claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress).
100. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 273 (explaining proximate causation
in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases).
101. Compare Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(noting that plaintiff must show actual exposure to AIDS), Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d
881, 886-89 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (same), Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127
(App. Div. 1991) (denying recovery for fear of AIDS because plaintiff could not
demonstrate that he was infected with AIDS), Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis
Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn. 1993) (same), Funeral Servs. by
Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Cmty. Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991) (same),
and Johnson v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va. 1991)
(same), with Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(requiring reasonableness of fear), Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 336-37 (Md.
1993) (same), and Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 22-23 (N.J. 1997) (same).
But see Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Res., Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59, 75 (D. Mass. 1993)
(stating that plaintiff who was inoculated with HIV-positive vaccine established
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1. Majority Position-Actual Exposure
A majority of jurisdictions find that the plaintiff can establish actual
exposure and, therefore, that his or her fear is reasonable if there is "expo-
sure to tissue, blood, or body fluid infected with HIV, and.., the exposure
to the infected tissue, blood, or body fluid... [is] by way of a channel of
communication or transmission deemed medically or scientifically suffi-
cient to cause an HIV infection."' 0 2 If the plaintiff fails to demonstrate
actual exposure then the claim for emotional distress is unreasonable as a
matter of law because the plaintiffs emotional damages are deemed an
unforeseeable result of the defendant's negligent act.1 0 3 Most courts were
influenced by fear of cancer claims in creating this standard. 10 4 The ac-
tual exposure requirement purports to ensure the genuineness of the
claim and objectify results.1 0 5
For example, in Majca v. Beeki410 6 the Illinois Supreme Court denied
recovery in two fear of AIDS claims because the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate actual exposure.' 0 7 In the first cause of action, the plaintiff, Majca,
was an office worker for a physician. 10 8 Her responsibilities included emp-
tying the trash receptacles. 10 9 The plaintiff cut her hand on a discarded
scalpel when she pressed down on the trash to compact it." 0 The scalpel
cause of action under actual exposure requirement and reasonableness standard
because of direct exposure); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 290-92
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that paramedics who were actually exposed to HIV-
positive blood when they performed life-saving procedures on infected person
could not recover for emotional distress under terms of insurance policy until they
demonstrated physical impairment or harm caused by exposure); Chadwick, supra
note 1, at 170-71 (advocating alternative in which court addresses validity of claim
under duty analysis). The Missouri and Nebraska Supreme Courts kept an actual
exposure requirement, but made exceptions because the modes of transmission
were unavailable for testing. See generally S. Cent. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749
So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1999) (finding difficulty in applying either standard); Hartwig v.
Or. Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 91 (Neb. 1998) (same). For a further discus-
sion of Hartwig and Pickering, see infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
102. Hartwig, 580 N.W.2d at 91.
103. See, e.g., Russaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508, 512 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (stat-
ing that plaintiffs fear of AIDS was unreasonable and unforeseeable due to lack of
actual exposure).
104. See generally Harper v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1987)
(indicating that plaintiff may not recover for emotional distress unless there is suf-
ficient evidence of exposure to potentially harmful agent); Maddy v. Vulcan Mater-
ials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1990) (noting that plaintiff must demonstrate
actual exposure to harmful substance).
105. See Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 594 (noting that actual exposure requirement is
objective standard for recovery).
106. 701 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. 1998).
107. See Majca, 701 N.E.2d at 1091 (discussing failure of claims due to lack of
actual exposure).
108. See id. at 1085 (stating facts).
109. See id.
110. See id.
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was covered with dry blood and a mucus-like substance.11 1 Majca immedi-
ately went to a hospital where she received six stitches for the cut and took
an HIV test.112 Majca failed to confront the responsible physician about
the carelessly discarded scalpel.1 13 The physician died of an AIDS-related
illness eight months later. 114
In the second cause of action, the unnamed plaintiffs were patients of
a dental student at Northwestern University. 115 Some time after treat-
ment, the plaintiffs received a letter from the University stating "[W]e
[have] learned that a dental student involved in providing care to you in
the Dental Clinic has tested positive for HIV .... -116 Although the letter
stated that the chances of any of the plaintiffs contracting the virus were
remote, the University still recommended that all the patients be tested for
HIV.117
Majca's claim failed because the scalpel that cut her was unavailable
for testing, and as a result, she could not demonstrate that the dried blood
on the scalpel was infected with HIV.118 The court surmised that "[a]t
most, [Majca has] established that [she] cut her hand on a scalpel that
may have been used by an HIV-infected podiatrist."' 19 Similarly, the sec-
ond cause of action failed because the plaintiffs did not point to an inci-
dent where their blood or fluids came into contact with the dental
student's blood or fluids. 120 Therefore, the plaintiffs' emotional distress
damages, genuine or not, were unreasonable as a matter of law. 121
The Minnesota Supreme Court also held that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate actual exposure in K.A.C. v. Benson.122 In K.A.C., the defen-
dant, Dr. Benson, performed two gynecological procedures on the plain-
tiff, T.M.W., while he was H1V-positive and suffered from open sores on his
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1086.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1087.
116. Id.
117. See id. But see Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1068 (Ct. App.
1994) (noting that colleagues of defendant HIV-positive physician said that physi-
cians frequently cut and poke themselves with needles and knives during surgery).
Nonetheless, in Kerins, the operative report and defendant's testimony support the
contention that he did not cut himself during surgery. See id. at 1067-68 (noting
results of operative report).
118. See Majca, 701 N.E.2d at 1090-91 (collecting facts that demonstrate Majca
failed to meet actual exposure requirement).
119. Id. at 1091.
120. See id. at 1091 ("For example, it was never alleged that: [the defendant]
bled into a plaintiff's mouth by accidentally cutting himself during a dental proce-
dure; [the defendant] pricked himself with a needle prior to using the needle on a
plaintiff; or [the defendant] otherwise exposed a plaintiff to HIV.").
121. See id. (noting that, without actual exposure, plaintiffs failed to state
cause of action).
122. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
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hands and forearms. 123 The court applied the zone of danger rule be-
cause it is the prevailing standard of recovery for emotional distress in
Minnesota.1 24 Thus, T.M.W. could only recover if she demonstrated that
she was in danger of physical harm. 125 In fear of AIDS claims, the court
explained, only actual exposure to HIV/AIDS shows physical danger.1 2 6
Hence, T.M.W. was denied recovery because she did not allege that the
open sores on Benson's hands or forearms came into contact with her skin
or blood.12 7
The actual exposure requirement is based on public policy ratio-
nales.1 28 Because of the inherent speculation involved in fear of AIDS
claims, courts feel that the actual exposure requirement "ensure[s] the
genuineness of the . . . claim."1 29 Furthermore, the actual exposure re-
quirement purports to prevent a flood of litigation.1 30 Similar to the func-
tion of the physical injury requirement, courts substitute the actual
exposure requirement to objectify the emotional injury.' 3 '
2. Minority Position-Reasonableness
a. Defining a Reasonableness Standard
The reasonableness standard permits recovery of purely emotional
distress damages for fear of AIDS claims if the plaintiff can prove that a
specific occurrence of potential exposure was sufficient to create a reason-
123. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 555 (stating facts).
124. See id. at 559 (stating that Minnesota limits recovery for emotional dis-
tress to instances in which plaintiff was placed in physical danger).
125. See id. (stating that plaintiff must prove that she was reasonably endan-
gered with physical harm).
126. See id. ("[W]e hold that a plaintiff who fails to allege actual exposure to
HIV is not, as a matter of law, in personal physical danger of contracting HIV, and
thus not within the zone of danger .... ").
127. See id. at 560 (noting that plaintiff did not demonstrate any instance in
which defendant's skin came into contact with her blood).
128. See, e.g., Shahvari, supra note 2, at 796 ("[B]y requiring proof of exposure
... courts seek to ensure the genuineness of the [fear of] AIDS .. . claim.").
129. See id. (noting policy behind courts' requirement of proof of exposure);
see also Roes v. FHP, Inc., 985 P.2d 661, 667 (Haw. 1999) (stating that "actual expo-
sure to HIV-positive blood... pose [s] a direct, immediate, and serious threat to an
individual's safety, [and] such exposure would foreseeably engender serious
mental distress in a reasonable person" (footnote omitted)). In Roes, the court
found that the actual exposure requirement was an adequate replacement for the
physical harm requirement in measuring the genuineness of a plaintiffs claim. See
Roes, 985 P.2d at 664-68 (discussing evolution of Hawaii's negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action from physical injury to actual exposure).
130. See Shahvari, supra note 2, at 796 (stating that actual exposure require-
ment discourages others from instituting suits based on less demanding
standards).
131. See, e.g., Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594
(Tenn. 1993) ("Because ... we have never deviated from an objective standard for
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, but have merely employed a dif-
ferent type of objective standard because of the changed nature of the actions, we
hereby formally adopt the 'actual exposure' approach.").
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able fear of having contracted HIV/AIDS.132 The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals adopted the reasonableness standard in Faya v. Almaraz.13 3 In Faya,
the defendant, Dr. Rudolf Almaraz, performed invasive surgery on the two
plaintiffs at a time when he knew he was HIV-positive.134 After nearly two
years had passed, and Almaraz had succumbed to the disease, the plaintiffs
discovered Almaraz's HIV-positive status through a local newspaper arti-
cle.' 35 Both plaintiffs tested HIV-negative within weeks of reading the arti-
cle. 136 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs brought fear of AIDS claims against
Almaraz's estate.
13 7
The court reasoned, in deciding proximate cause, that the actual ex-
posure requirement produced harsh results.' 38 Thus, the court over-
turned Almaraz's motion to dismiss and explained that the "actual
transmission [requirement] ... unfairly punish [es] [plaintiffs that] lack[]
the requisite information. .".. 9
132. See, e.g., Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 22 (NJ. 1997) (adopting
standard of reasonableness over actual exposure requirement).
133. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993). Although the court adopted the reasonable-
ness standard, the plaintiff must demonstrate manifestations of the emotional dis-
tress. See id. at 338-39 (stating that plaintiffs may recover for emotional injuries
that can be objectively demonstrated).
134. See Faya, 620 A.2d at 329 (stating that Almaraz removed axillary hema-
toma and benign lump from plaintiffs, respectively).
135. See id. (stating facts).
136. See id. at 329 (stating that plaintiffs learned of newspaper article around
December 6, 1990 and immediately sought testing for HIV).
137. See id. (stating that plaintiffs also filed suit against Almaraz's hospital,
where he had operative privileges). Although the court never expressly stated that
the claim was for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the claim was for only
emotional damages and the court used the actual exposure/reasonableness proxi-
mate cause analysis. See id. at 335-39 (examining what standard applies to plain-
tiffs' emotional injuries in context of fear of AIDS claim based on negligence).
The complaints also included counts of negligent failure to obtain informed con-
sent, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresenta-
tion and breach of contract. See id. at 330 (stating counts of complaints).
138. See id. at 333-35 (explaining that Almaraz had duty to plaintiff to obtain
her consent before operating). The court appeared to find the duty analysis per-
suasive in ultimately permitting the plaintiffs to overcome the motion to dismiss
their fear of AIDS claim. See id. (discussing duty).
139. Id. at 337. The court took judicial notice of verifiable facts about AIDS.
See id. at 331 ("[I]n order to place a complaint in context, we may take judicial
notice of additional facts that are either matters of common knowledge or [are]
capable of certain verification."). This was to dispute the contention by plaintiffs
that the lower court improperly took judicial notice of facts that were open to
dispute through expert testimony. See id. at 332-33 (noting plaintiffs' contention).
But see Dollar Inn, Inc. v. Slone, 695 N.E.2d 185, 187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (re-
fusing to take judicial notice of facts on appeal that pertained to transmission of
AIDS because they were not raised at trial and would be utilized to fill "evidentiary
gaps").
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b. The Williamson Decision-Setting a New Standard
Four years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that the rea-
sonableness standard effectively addressed the issue of proximate cause in
Williamson v. Waldman.140 Nevertheless, because of the public policy con-
cern that neither standard effectively combated ignorance about AIDS,
the court enhanced the standard by holding that:
[A] person claiming damages for emotional distress based on the
fear that she has contracted HIV must demonstrate that the de-
fendant's negligence proximately caused her genuine and sub-
stantial emotional distress that would be experienced by a
reasonable person of ordinary experience who has a level of knowl-
edge that coincides with then-current, accurate, and generally available
public information about the causes and transmission of ALDS.14 '
In Williamson, the plaintiff, Karen Williamson, worked for her hus-
band's cleaning business and was assigned to clean the examining room
that the defendant physicians maintained.' 4 2 In the process of emptying a
common-trash receptacle, Williamson pricked her hand on an improperly
discarded lancet.143 As a result, she instituted a claim of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, asserting that the lancet-stick incident caused
her to suffer severe emotional distress due to her fear of contracting HIV/
AIDS.' 44 The plaintiff tested negative for HIV on every occasion after the
incident and therefore suffered purely emotional damages.
145
140. 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997). For a further discussion of how the reasonable-
ness standard addresses proximate cause, see infra notes 141-62 and accompanying
text.
141. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 22 (emphasis added).
142. See id. at 16 (stating facts).
143. See id. at 15-16 (stating facts). Under New Jersey law, waste must be dis-
posed of in appropriate, correctly labeled, medical-waste receptacles. See id. at 17
n.1 (citing New Jersey statutes that govern waste disposal). Williamson was at-
tempting to remove EKG stickers from the trash can when the lancet-stick incident
took place. SeeWilliamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996) (stating facts), affd, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997).
144. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 15-16 (stating facts). Williamson asserted that
the incident forced her to make "lifestyle changes," which included a decision not
to have another baby or engage in unprotected sexual relations with her husband.
See id. at 16 (stating facts). Nonetheless, Williamson was notalarmed by the inci-
dent until she spoke with an acquaintance who was a nurse and who informed her
that she was potentially exposed to hepatitis and AIDS. See id. (noting that plaintiff
became particularly alarmed about contracting hepatitis and AIDS and that nurse
told her to go to emergency room). Conversely, Williamson's physician character-
ized her as a nervous person and had referred her to other doctors for professional
treatment of depression prior to the incident. See id. at 17 (stating facts).
145. See id. at 16 (noting that plaintiff tested negative in July 1992, 1993 and
1994). "After the second negative test result, [plaintiffs physician] informed [her]
that her chances of having contracted HIV from the incident were 'slim or re-
mote.'" Id. Although it is not addressed in either the appellate or supreme court
opinion, it appears that the lancet responsible for Williamson's wound was no
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i. Choosing Reasonableness Over Actual Exposure for Proximate Cause
The Williamson court reviewed the case law and policy arguments that
supported both the actual exposure standard and reasonableness standard
to decide which standard was most appropriate. 14 6 The court noted that,
absent an actual exposure standard, a flood of litigation could ensue.
14 7
In addition, "the strict objective standard . . . [is needed] to counteract
general ignorance about AIDS .... Thus, a low threshold for establishing
proximate cause, such as the reasonableness standard, will not discourage
misleading and inaccurate information or counteract ignorance .... ,148
Although the court appeared to agree that the actual exposure standard
combats ignorance concerning AIDS, it nonetheless noted articles that
contend that the majority standard accomplishes the exact opposite. 149
Presumably, this was to foreshadow the unveiling of their forthcoming en-
hanced reasonableness standard. 150
First, though, the court reviewed policy considerations in support of
the reasonableness standard. 15 1 The court noted that the actual exposure
requirement produced harsh results. 15 2 Moreover, the court determined
that the reasonableness standard effectively promoted reasonable care and
could ensure the genuineness of the claim. 153 Finally, the court noted
longer available for testing. See id. at 14-24 (failing to address lancet's availability
for testing); Williamson, 677 A.2d at 1179-82 (same).
146. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 18-20 (reviewing majority case law). The
court explained that some majority jurisdictions have "expressly ... added the
further requirement that a plaintiff prove a medically sound channel of transmis-
sion of the HIV virus." Id. at 18. The courts that adopt the channel of transmis-
sion requirement are considered to be the majority and normally umbrella the
medically sound channel requirement under one rule with actual exposure to
HIV. See id. at 18-19 (discussing overall majority view including discussion of chan-
nel of transmission as part of majority's view of actual exposure). The Williamson
court also recognized some of the public policy arguments behind the actual expo-
sure requirement. See id. at 19-20 (noting that actual exposure requirement en-
sures courts will not be flooded with fraudulent claims and combats ignorance
about the disease). The court also cited commentators who believed that the ac-
tual exposure requirement did not address ignorance about AIDS. See id. at 20
(collecting articles).
147. See id. at 19 (stating that one policy rationale of actual exposure require-
ment is to deter flood of litigation).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 20 ("[T]he inference is that a reasonable person of ordinary
intelligence would not fear that he would develop AIDS unless he had proof that
he had actually been exposed to the virus. This is contrary to common experience,
however." (quoting Edward M. Slaughter, AIDS Phobia: The Infliction of Emotional
Distress and the Fear of AIDS, 16 U. HAw. L. REv. 143, 160 (1994))).
150. See generally Williamson, 696 A.2d at 21-22 (discussing enhanced reasona-
bleness standard).
151. For a further discussion of the court's review of the reasonableness stan-
dard, see infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
152. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 20 (stating that actual exposure requirement
can produce harsh results).
153. See id. at 20 (stating that reasonableness standard promotes reasonable
care and can assure genuineness of claims).
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that the reasonableness standard more readily provided redress for legiti-
mate claims. 154 The court concluded that the policy arguments in sup-
port of the reasonableness standard outweighed those in support of the
actual exposure requirement. 155
ii. Unveiling a New Standard-The Enhanced Reasonableness Standard
Because public policy plays such a strong role in the debate over
which standard to apply in the context of a fear of AIDS claim, the William-
son court cited the greatest policy concern regarding AIDS, education
about the disease, to enhance the reasonableness standard. 156 The en-
hanced reasonableness standard, the court explained, imputes a "level of
knowledge that coincides with then-current, accurate, and generally availa-
ble public information about the causes and transmission of AIDS" to the
plaintiff.157 The court hoped that the enhancement would promote edu-
cation, which would, in turn, calm the irrational fears that confront the
disease and fight the prejudice and discrimination that surround it.1 58
Additionally, because no other standard took an affirmative approach, the
court noted that alternative standards indirectly encourage ignorance.159
Turning to the validity of Williamson's claim, the court held that she
could recover for the emotional distress suffered during the window of
154. See id. at 20 ("[T] he reasonableness standard accommodates the tort pol-
icy of providing redress for harm suffered at the hands of another.").
155. See id. at 20-21 (stating that reasonableness standard effectively fulfills
basic goals of tort doctrine).
156. See id. at 21-22 (discussing enhancement of reasonableness standard in
fear of AIDS claims). Imputation of this knowledge is applied in the latter portion
of the opinion. See id. at 23 (applying enhanced reasonableness standard to cir-
cumstances of Williamson's claim). The plaintiffs physician originally told her
that she needed to be tested annually for a period of seven to ten years. See id. at
16 (noting physician's recommendation). Normally, a nearly mathematically con-
clusive test can be administered six months after the exposure. See Kerins v. Hart-
ley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 175 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that HIV test is ninety-five
percent accurate six months after exposure). Because the imputation of knowl-
edge applied in Williamson requires the plaintiff to know about the available facts
on AIDS, the court found that it was illogical to hold the original tortfeasor respon-
sible for the plaintiffs physician's misinformation. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 24
("The circumstances of this case ... militate against holding the initial tortfeasors
liable for the consequences of the subsequent incorrect medical advice .... Our
adoption of the enhanced reasonableness standard.., is based ... on the policy
consideration that ignorance concerning HIV and AIDS ought to be discouraged
.... .).
157. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 22.
158. See id. at 21-22 (stating that reasonableness standard that requires only
common knowledge about AIDS actually encourages misperceptions about the dis-
ease); cf. WARD, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that education about HIV/AIDS has
lessened pervasiveness of negative stigma).
159. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 21-22 (noting that alternative standards do
not adequately address education about HIV/AIDS).
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anxiety. 160 The window of anxiety runs from the time that the plaintiff
discovers that he or she may have been exposed to HIV until he or she
receives a test that conclusively demonstrates his or her status.161 The
court concluded that any person would reasonably be distressed after
puncturing their hand on medical waste, or at least until he or she could
obtain HIV test results. 16 2
IV. ADOPTING THE ENHANCED REASONABLENESS STANDARD
In light of the progress in negligent infliction of emotional distress
and the devastating characteristics of HIV/AIDS, fear of AIDS claims are
worthy of individual evaluation.1 63 Consequently, the enhanced reasona-
bleness standard formulated in Williamson effectively undertakes this indi-
vidual evaluation by permitting recovery through a standard of
reasonableness that imputes accurate knowledge of the disease to the
plaintiff.1 64 Moreover, the enhanced reasonableness standard adequately
addresses the policy considerations of tort law. 16 5
A. Progress in Recognizing Emotional Distress
Over the past century, tort law has expanded its recognition of emo-
tional distress damages through the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.166 Tort law was established, in part, to assign liability to
those who have committed a wrong. 167 In this pursuit, tort law has recog-
nized that stand-alone emotional distress damages are worthy of redress in
certain circumstances.1 68 Most strikingly, Dillon rejected the zone of dan-
ger rule in bystander claims because the emotional trauma suffered was
160. See id. at 23 (stating that damages should be constricted to window of
anxiety).
161. See id. (stating that window of anxiety is "the period from the time of
possible exposure to that point when a plaintiff knows or should know that [he or]
she was not infected with HIV").
162. See id. at 24 (permitting recovery of Williamson's reasonable emotional
distress).
163. For a further discussion of the reasons to adopt the enhanced reasona-
bleness standard, see infra notes 188-219 and accompanying text.
164. For a further discussion of the enhanced reasonableness standard
adopted by Williamson, see supra notes 140-62 and accompanying text.
165. For a further discussion of how the enhanced reasonableness standard
addresses policy considerations, see supra notes 146-62 and accompanying text.
166. For a further discussion of the evolution of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, see supra notes 23-75 and accompanying text.
167. SeeJohn A. Turcotte, When You Should Have Known: Rethinking Construc-
tive Knowledge in Tort Liability for Sexual Transmission of HIV, 52 ME. L. REv. 261, 262
(2000) (noting that purpose of tort law is to apportion responsibility).
168. For a further discussion of stand-alone emotional distress damages, see
supra notes 23-75 and accompanying text.
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both foreseeable and worthy of redress.1 69 There, the court reasoned that
the "interests of meritorious plaintiffs should prevail over ... administra-
tive difficulties." 1 70 As a result, many jurisdictions adopted Dillon's fore-
seeability factors to address legitimate claims. 17
Continuing this evolution, courts have widely recognized emotional
distress damages in fear of cancer claims.' 72 In doing so, courts discarded
the physical injury requirement in favor of standards of recovery that va-
ried in the burden placed on the plaintiff.1 73 One of the most strict appli-
cations was the more likely than not standard set forth in Potter.174
Nevertheless, by comparing the primary rationale for the strict stan-
dard in Potter and the fundamental characteristics of the diseases, it is ap-
parent that fear of AIDS claims warrant a broader standard of recovery
than fear of cancer claims.' 75 In creating its more likely than not stan-
dard, Potter relied heavily on the possibility of opening the floodgates of
litigation.' 7 6 Logically, a floodgates argument may apply to fear of cancer
169. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968) (stating that rejecting
mother's distress because of distance exposes arbitrary nature of zone of danger
rule).
170. Id. at 918. The Dillon court also encouraged courts to use the foresee-
ability factors as a guide in performing a case-by-case analysis of bystander emo-
tional distress claims. See id. at 921 ("Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn
on whether the particular defendant... would have in actuality foreseen the exact
accident and loss; it contemplates that courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all
the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances
should reasonably have foreseen."); see also Leibson, supra note 37, at 195 (explain-
ing that emotional distress damages should be evaluated on case-by-case basis).
171. For a further discussion of jurisdictions adopting the foreseeability fac-
tors, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
172. See Fink, supra note 63, at 782-86 (analyzing bystander claims as lead-in to
fear of disease claims).
173. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir.
1985) (requiring physical injury requirement); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744
P.2d 705, 711 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (requiring physical injury to succeed on asbes-
tos exposure claim); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 528-29 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (requiring physical injury in enhanced risk of cancer claim
after exposure to asbestos); Wetherhill v. Univ. of Chi., 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559-60
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (requiring plaintiffs exposed to DES to demonstrate reasonable-
ness of fear of cancer and physical impact).
174. See Macy's Cal., Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496, 501 (Ct. App. 1995)
(describing standard created in Potter as strict).
175. See Temple-Inland Prod. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tex. 1999)
(stating that "[t]he principles we have used to deny recovery of mental anguish
damages for fear of the possibility of developing a disease as a result of an expo-
sure to asbestos may not yield the same result when the exposure is to some other
dangerous or toxic element").
176. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 811-14 (Cal.
1993) (citing floodgates rationale for promulgating more likely than not stan-
dard). In Potter, the court stated:
[A]I1 of us are potential fear of cancer plaintiffs, provided we are suffi-
ciently aware of and worried about the possibility of developing cancer
from exposure to or ingestion of a carcinogenic substance. The enormity
of the class of potential plaintiffs cannot be overstated; indeed, a single
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claims because of society's mass exposure to carcinogens. 177 On the con-
trary, exposure to AIDS occurs in limited circumstances. 178 The factual
circumstances of most cases demonstrate that even potential exposure to
AIDS is rather limited. 179 Fear of AIDS claims find their genesis in im-
properly disposed needles, surgeons with AIDS and unsterile surgical
tools.1 8 0 Thus, a strict standard of recovery is unnecessary to restrict flood-
gates in fear of AIDS claims.1 8 '
Moreover, there are fundamental differences between the two dis-
eases. Unlike cancer, potential exposure to HIV/AIDS is treated medi-
cally the same as actual exposure.182 Potentially exposed persons must
conduct themselves as if they are infected in their contact with family and
friends.' 8 3 It appears inequitable to leave potentially exposed plaintiffs
class action may easily involve hundreds, if not thousands, of fear of can-
cer claims.
Id. at 812. See also Symposium, supra note 59, at 308-09 (stating that class of poten-
tial plaintiffs could be never ending because of everyday exposure).
177. SeeJackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir.
1985) (estimating that over twenty-one million Americans have experienced signif-
icant exposure to asbestos fibers).
178. See LaurenJ. Camillo, Note, Adding Fuel to the Fire: Realistic Fears or Unreal-
istic Damages in AIDS Phobia Suits?, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 331, 350 (1994) (noting that
there are limited modes of transmission). For a further discussion of the modes of
transmission, see supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
179. See generally Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (HIV-positive sur-
geon performed operations on plaintiffs); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14
(N.J. 1997) (exposure through improperly discarded lancet); Hinote v. Rio
Grande Surgery Ctr. Assocs., No. 13-99-489-6V, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 6011 (App.
Aug. 31, 2000) (same anesthesia kit that was used on patient with hepatitis C was
used on plaintiff). Cf DOBBS, supra note 23, § 312, at 849 ("When the defendant
owes an independent duty of care to the plaintiff, there is no risk of unlimited
liability to an unlimited number of people.").
180. For examples of these claims, see sources cited in supra note 179.
181. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 n.3 (Cal. 1968) (stating that
"courts are responsible for dealing with cases on their merits, whether there be few
suits or many"). Thus, if the courts can not handle the claims then there should
be more courts. See id. at 917 n.3 (stating that multitude of claims exemplifies
need for redress).
182. See Hartwig v. Or. Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Neb. 1998) (stat-
ing that person potentially exposed to HIV must conduct his or her life as if they
were actually exposed); Occupational Exposure to HIV, supra note 85 (outlining
CDC's precautions for health-care workers exposed to HIV-positive blood). The
CDC states that:
During the follow-up period, especially the first 6-12 weeks when most
infected persons are expected to show signs of infection, you should fol-
low recommendations for preventing transmission of HIV. These include
refraining from blood, semen, or organ donation and abstaining from
sexual intercourse. If you choose to have sexual intercourse, using a latex
condom consistently and correctly may reduce the risk of HIV transmis-
sion. In addition, women should not breast-feed infants during the fol-
low-up period to prevent exposing their infants to HIV in breast milk.
Id.
183. See id. (stating that persons potentially exposed should abstain from inti-
mate contact).
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uncompensated for the six-month testing period when, in most instances,
the cost of preventing the negligent conduct was slight.18 4 Additionally,
negative stigma attaches to an HIV-positive diagnosis, which may increase
.the emotional distress suffered by a fear of AIDS plaintiff.1 85 Finally, AIDS
is incurable. 18 6 Conversely, someone who is exposed to a carcinogen and
ultimately develops cancer maintains a fifty-nine percent overall survival
rate.1 87 Hence, a broader standard of recovery is appropriate in fear of
AIDS claims.
B. Enhanced Reasonableness Versus Actual Exposure
The broader standard of recovery that this Note adopts is the en-
hanced reasonableness standard formulated in Williamson.'88 It effectively
addresses fear of AIDS claims by more readily recognizing legitimate
claims, promoting reasonable care and affirmatively combating ignorance
about AIDS. 1 8 9
A main utility of the actual exposure requirement is that it promotes
predictability in the adjudication of fear of AIDS claims. °9 0 Nevertheless,
. 184. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 26, at 157-58 ("[T]his departure from the previ-
ous all-or-nothing approach to recovery reaffirms 'the loss-assigning role of [tort]
law,' properly placing on the defendant the burden of 'grappl[ing] with im-
ponderables of chance."' (quoting Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences,
90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1377, 1378 (1981))).
185. For a further discussion of the negative treatment AIDS victims have re-
ceived, see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
186. See Doe v. Wash. Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (noting
that AIDS is incurable); Amy L. McGuire, Comment, AIDS as a Weapon: Criminal
Prosecution of H1VExposure, 36 Hous. L. REv. 1787, 1793 (1999) (noting that AIDS
remains incurable).
187. See American Cancer Society, What Percentage of People Survive Cancer,
available at http://www3.cancer.org/cancerinfo/sitecenter (last visited Oct. 21,
2000) (stating that overall survival rate is fifty-nine percent). The percentage is
measured by the five-year survival rate, which compares survival rate of cancer vic-
tims to those in general population who are the same age, gender and race. See id.
(noting calculation of percentage); see also Suzanne V. Cocca, Note, Who's Monitor-
ing the Quality of Mammograms? The Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992 Could
Finally Provide the Answer, 19 AM.J.L. & MED. 313, 314 (1993) (noting that if breast
cancer is detected early, five-year survival rate is ninety-one percent).
188. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 21-22 (discussing enhanced reasonableness
standard).
189. For a further discussion of how the enhanced reasonableness standard
addresses these public policy issues, see supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Levit, supra note 26, at 136-37 (noting that courts seek order
and predictability). The author notes that the "individualized goal of compensa-
tory justice" confronts courts' desire to formulate predictable rules. See id. at 139
(stating that development of intangible harm clashes with recognition of legiti-
mate claims). "If emphasis is placed on predictability of outcomes, compensation
of individual harms will suffer." Id. at 164; see also Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084,
1090 (Ill. 1998) (stating that objective actual exposure standard ensures stability,
consistency and predictability). "[A]n actual exposure requirement prevents an
individual from recovering damages for a fear of contracting AIDS when that fear
236
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choosing form over substance readily disposes of legitimate claims as com-
pared to a standard of reasonableness. 19 1 The mechanical nature of the
actual exposure requirement was demonstrated in Majca.19 2 In Majca's
first cause of action, the plaintiff was unable to prove actual exposure be-
cause the scalpel was no longer available for testing. 19 3 As the Faya court
concluded, it is inequitable to punish plaintiffs for lacking the requisite
information to prove actual exposure. 194 Fortunately, some courts that
favor the actual exposure requirement have made exceptions to it.19 5
In Hartwig v. Oregon Trail Eye Clinic,19 6 the Nebraska Supreme Court
refused to apply the actual exposure requirement when the needle that
pricked the plaintiff was unavailable for testing.197 The court recognized
that when a plaintiff has been potentially exposed to HIV/AIDS through a
medically recognized channel of transmission and it is impracticable to
determine whether the product of transmission was HIV-positive, then her
or his fear of AIDS is not unreasonable as a matter of law.' 9 8 Likewise, in
South Central Regional Medical Center v. Pickering, 199 the plaintiff was pricked
with a lancet that the defendant's nurse used on other unknown pa-
tients. 20 0 Unfortunately, the lancet kit was disposed of before it could be
tested. 20 ' The court, determined not to abandon the actual exposure re-
is based on lack of information or inaccurate information regarding the transmis-
sion of HIV." Majca, 701 N.E.2d at 1090.
191. See, e.g., Chester v. Mustang Mfg. Co., 998 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (resolving bystander liability by determining whether plaintiff's husband was
dead when she arrived on scene of accident, rather than evaluating legitimacy of
plaintiff's emotional distress).
192. See Majca, 701 N.E.2d at 1091-92 (applying actual exposure
requirement).
193. See id. at 1091 (noting that scalpel was no longer available for testing).
194. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 337, (Md. 1993) (stating that it is unfair to
punish plaintiffs who cannot prove actual exposure because they lack information
to do so).
195. See S. Cent. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749 So. 2d 95, 102 (Miss. 1999)
(making exception to strict actual exposure requirement); Hartwig v. Or. Trail Eye
Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Neb. 1998) (same).
196. 580 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1998).
197. See Hartwig, 580 N.W.2d at 89 (noting that needles that pricked plaintiff
were never tested and presumably no longer available).
198. See id. at 94 (describing when plaintiff can recover for fear of AIDS in
absence of key evidence).
199. 749 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1999).
200. See Pickering, 749 So. 2d at 97 (stating facts). Pickering was tested for HIV
while at the hospital and five more times thereafter. See id. at 97-98 (noting that
Pickering was later tested in November 1987, January 1988, March 1988, Septem-
ber 1988 and once by another institution in August 1990). The same kit was used
on at least eleven other patients. See id. at 97 (stating facts).
201. See id. at 97 (stating facts). The nurse claimed that she had not disposed
of them sooner because the receptacle was new to the room and she was unfamil-
iar with its presence. See id. ("Pickering claims that the nurse responded that the
receptacle was only implemented two weeks earlier and that she had not grown
accustomed to using it.").
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quirement, created an elaborate pleading system, where a rebuttable pre-
sumption of actual exposure arose in favor of the plaintiff in a fear of
AIDS claim when the defendant had caused the best evidence to be
destroyed.2 02
Application of the actual exposure requirement in such circum-
stances begs the question as to why courts need apply it at all. These deci-
sions appear to destroy consistency by mutating the standard. 20 3
Moreover, a per se barrier to recovery can only be appropriate when the
judicial system adopts a presumption that many plaintiffs inherently bring
false suits and that such a barrier is required to weed out false claims
before they make it to the courts. 20 4 Nevertheless, the function of evalua-
tion should be left to the fact-finder and, as a result, fear of AIDS claims
should be individually evaluated with the enhanced reasonableness
standard. 205
The enhanced reasonableness approach will also promote a greater
degree of reasonable care. Tort law was also established to "mold[ ] be-
havior." 20 6 Presumably, when liability is imposed on defendants, a higher
degree of care will result.20 7 For example, Majca, Pickering, Hartwig and
Williamson resulted, in part, because of unsterile instruments.20 8 Weigh-
ing the slight cost of properly sterilizing the instruments against the gravity
of the harm, it appears equitable for the defendants to bear the cost of
their negligence. 209
202. See id. at 102 ("[Wlhere the defendant allowed or caused the best evi-
dence to be destroyed.., a rebuttable presumption of actual exposure would arise
in favor of the plaintiff.").
203. See, e.g., id. (creating rebuttable presumption test, which is unique to that
jurisdiction).
204. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Greenstein, Note, New Jersey's Continuing Expansion of
Tort Liability: Williamson v. Waldman and the Fear of AIDS Cause of Action, 30
RUTGERS L.J. 489, 489 (1999) (noting that if person is stuck with discarded needle
in New Jersey, they should "put [a] band-aide on, hire a lawyer, and immediately
file suit").
205. See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 308, at 836 (noting that, in addition to trials,judicial review of excessive awards also serves as a check on fraudulent claims);
Miller, supra note 37, at 693 (stating that determination of claim's genuineness
should be left to fact-finder).
206. Levit, supra note 26, at 179.
207. See, e.g., Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 923 P.2d 1154, 1162 (N.M.
1996) ("In light of the deadly nature of the AIDS virus, reasonable care should be
encouraged, for example, in the handling of potential disease-transmitting agents
such as blood products. The potential for liability encourages those engaged in
conduct that may result in an exposure incident to use reasonable care.").
208. See Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084, 1085 (I11. 1998) (improperly dis-
posed needle); S. Cent. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749 So. 2d 95, 97 (Miss. 1999)
(lancets used on other patients); Hartwig v. Or. Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 96
(Neb. 1998) (improperly disposed needle); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14,
16 (NJ. 1997) (improperly disposed needle).
209. See DOBBS, supra note 23, at 340 (explaining Judge Learned Hand's clas-
sic negligence formula).
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The additional feature of imputing then-current knowledge about
HIV/AIDS to the plaintiff should dispel any remaining reservations about
its appropriateness. By imputing then-current knowledge to plaintiffs, the
enhanced reasonableness standard is the only standard that affirmatively
combats ignorance. 210 Education about AIDS is more important than
ever before. 2 11 Commentators report that many people have become apa-
thetic about the disease.2 12 The majority of jurisdictions contend that an
actual exposure requirement promotes education about the disease and
ensures that the plaintiffs claim is not based on misconceptions. 2 13 Nev-
ertheless, it is generally not explained how the standard does this. 2 14 On
the other hand, the enhanced reasonableness standard affirmatively com-
bats ignorance. 215
In all tort claims, it is appropriate to impute a duty to mitigate dam-
ages upon the plaintiff.21 6 Now, more than ever before, information
about AIDS is readily available through multiple channels and needs to be
disseminated to the public. 2 17 As a result of the plaintiff's investigation,
he or she may discover that the mathematical chances of transmission are,
in fact, extremely low. As a result, the distress or damages are effectively
mitigated.218 Nevertheless, if a potential plaintiff foregoes the investiga-
210. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 22 (describing enhanced reasonableness
standard).
211. See Chadwick, supra note 1, at 143 ("As the prevalence of AIDS cases has
increased, so has the public's awareness of the dire consequences of infection with
the virus causing AIDS. For many, the omnipresence of AIDS has led to fear; in
some cases, the fear has reached the level of hysteria.").
212. See Karyn Miller-Medzon, Risky Behavior Spurs AIDS Threat; New Therapies
Lead to Infection Apathy, BOSTON HERALD,July 30, 2000, at 063 (stating that because
of effectiveness of new drug therapies small part of Massachusetts population
figures they will be able to adequately treat HIV if infected).
213. See Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1363 (Del. 1995) (stating that AIDS
"spawns widespread public misperception" and absence of actual exposure re-
quirement would encourage paranoia about the disease).
214. See Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594
(Tenn. 1993) (noting that opinions in favor of actual exposure requirement rarely
explain rationale).
215. For a further discussion of the enhanced reasonableness standard, see
supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Bums v. Hanson, 734 A.2d 964, 975 (Conn. 1999) (noting that
plaintiff has duty to mitigate damages in negligence claims).
217. One can simply explore the Internet for HIV/AIDS informational web-
sites. Examples include the Center for Disease Control (http://www.cdc.gov/),
National Institutes of Health (http://www.nih.gov/), AIDS: Education and Preven-
tion from the Growing Epidemic (http://library.thinkquest.org/10631/), Johns
Hopkins AIDS Service (http://www.hopkins-aids.edu/educational/index-edu.
html), YouthHIV.org (http://www.youthhiv.org/) and HIV Insite (http://hivin-
site.ucsf.edu/). Furthermore, the CDC provides an informational hotline at 1-800-
342-2437 and a treatment information service at 1-800-448-0440.
218. See, e.g., Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1068 n.3 (Ct. App.
1994) (relying on methodical analysis to demonstrate that plaintiff who was patient
of HIV-positive physician and already received one HIV-negative result, stood, at
most, one in 300,000 chance of contracting HIV). Kerins is one of the rare opin-
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tion then Williamson imputes to him or her what a reasonable investigation
would uncover. 219
V. CONCLUSION
This Note finds that the enhanced reasonableness standard, formu-
lated in Williamson, should govern fear of AIDS claims. It is consistent with
the evolution of negligent infliction of emotional distress, in which courts
have liberalized their recovery for emotional distress damages. Further-
more, the enhanced reasonableness standard effectively addresses the
unique characteristics of HIV/AIDS and the basic policy concerns that in-
fluence tort liability.
Alexander Santee
ions that relied on statistical analysis to address a fear of AIDS claim. See also
Shahvari, supra note 2, at 798 (encouraging courts to assess statistical probabilities
of contracting HIV/AIDS when evaluating fear of AIDS claims).
219. See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 21-22 (N.J. 1997) (discussing
enhanced reasonableness standard).
240 [Vol. 46: p. 207
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss1/6
